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heretofore been able to frustrate the
efforts of law enforcing officials to
prosecute for major depredations,
THE VAGRANCY STATuTE.-[Illinois]
James Belcastro and Louis Alterie public sentiment has forced these
were convicted separately under in- officers to try other means to curb
dictments charging them with vag- crime, not with adequate punishrancy under the Vagrancy Act as ment as the end in view but rather
amended in 1933. It provides that to harass the criminal and to satisfy
all persons who are "reputed to be
public opinion. An attempt was
habitual violators of the criminal made to prosecute under the old
laws of this State . . . or to Vagrancy Act and the public was
habitually carry concealed weapons treated to the spectacle of the
on or about their persons
wealthy gangster being charged unand all persons who are reputed to der a statute drawn to include penact as associates . . . of persons niless tramps and loiterers. The'inreputed to be habitual violators of adequacy of the statute to deal with
the criminal laws . . ." are va- the situation soon became apparent
grants: Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd
and whatever success might have
1933) c. 38 §578. They were con- been achieved through its use with
victed and sentenced to six months a demand for exorbitant bail was
imprisonment. Held: on appeal, re- blasted by the decision in People ex
versed.
The amendment to the rel. Sammons v. Snow (1930) 340
Vagrancy Act is unconstitutional in Ill. 464, 173 X. E. 8. There it was
that it is arbitrary and unreason- held that bail of $50,000 was exable legislation, its terms are un- cessive and that such bail would be
certain and it delegates arbitrary reduced on petition to the Supreme
and discriminatory power to admin- Court.
istrative officers: People v. Belcastro
In 1931 an attempt was made to
(Illinois 1934) 190 N. E. 301; Peo- amend the old Vagrancy Act to
ple v. Alterie (Illinois 1934) 190 provide, in effect, that any lawless
and notorious character, accustomed
N. E. 305.
These decisions mark the failure to live by the rule of the gun, should
of the latest legislative attempt to become a public menace by merely
deal with organized crime. Due to appearing on the street. A number
the expertness with which the mod- of specific acts such as intimidation
ern criminal carries out his projects of witnesses, perjury, bail jumping,
and the skill with which they have etc., were inserted to insure its conCONSTITUTIONAL
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stitutionality. This, however, met
with no success in the legislature
and was eventually dropped. Comment (1931) Notre Dame Law 254.
The amendment now under discussion was enacted in July, 1933,
and since that time has operated
most successfully in lower courts
in the accomplishment of its purpose. The difficulty of proof of a
specific crime against the criminal
member of an organized gang was
obviated by the provision that evidence of criminal reputation was
not only admissible in evidence but
was the essence of the crime itself.
Other states have made reputation
prima facie evidence of vagrancy
or of being a disorderly person (see
extended discussion of such statutes in Comment (1932) 30 Mich.
L. Rev. 600 and Note (1934) 24
J. Crim. L. 984 where the fate of
the Illinois act is correctly predicted) but none have gone so far
as Illinois. The act under discussion makes it a crime for an individual to have a reputation as an
habitual violator of the criminal
laws or as an associate of one who
is an habitual violator.
The question before the court in
the two present cases, therefore,
was whether an individual might be
imprisoned because of an evil reputation without violating the "due
process" clause of the Federal and
State Constitutions. In both cases
the court construed the statute as
is suggested above and then held
that it was void as unreasonable
and arbitrary legislation in that the
accused was to be held responsible
not for what he was but for what
other people said about him. This
same situation has arisen concerning
statutes providing for the prosecution of unlicensed dispensers of
liquor and prosecution of houses of
prostitution.
A case squarely in

point is State v. Kartz (1833) 13
R. I. 528. The statute in question
provided that any person who shall
keep a place in which it is reputed
that intoxicating liquors' are kept
for sale without a license shall be
fined. The court stated the question to be whether a man could be
fined and imprisoned for what
others said or believed. It was then
held that the law was ". . . renuanant to the fundamental rules
of our jurisprudence and so utterly
at variance with the general spirit
and principles of the Constitution in
regard to the rights of property and
personal freedom that it must be
held to be unconstitutional even
though no particular provision can
be pointed out the literal terms of
which it violates. To introduce into
the law the principle that a person
may be punished for what other
people say about him is to render
all the constitutional safeguards of
life, liberty and property unavailing for his protection . . ." This
decision is followed in cases involving prosecution for operating a disorderly house in that general reputation though admissible in evidence
must be corroborated by fact to
establish the character of the house:
Putnam v. State (1913) 9 Okla.
Crim. 535, 132 Pac. 916; State v.
Haberle (1887) 72 Iowa 138, 33 N.
W. 461; Botts v. United States
(1907) 155 Fed. 50. There are
cases holding to the contrary, however: People v. Buchanan (1878)
1 Idaho 681; Territory v. Bowen
(1890) 2 Idaho 640, 23 Pac. 82;
Moore v. State (1908) 53 Tex.
Crim. 59, 110 S. W. 911; Ramey v.
State (1898) 39 Tex. Crim. 200, 45
S. W. 489. But it must be noted
that the cases dealing with houses
of prostitution concern only the sufficiency of evidence to establish the
character of the house and the repu-
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tation is not the gist of the offense volved another constitutional objecas it is in the statute discussed in tion; i. e., delegation of legislative
the instant cases and State v. Kartz, power. The all important question
supra. A statute identical with that of reputation was left to the dediscussed in the latter case was at- termination of individuals without
perscribing any standards to act as
tacked in Starte v. Morgan (1873)
40 Conn. 44 but it was there con- a guide for their determination. It
has been. repeatedly held in Illinois
strued to mean that the prosecution
must charge and prove not merely that such delegation involves a depthe reputation but the fact of un- rivation of liberty. and property
licensed sale of liquor. It was there- without due process: Sheldon v.
fore deemed constitutional. Coun- Hoyne (1914) 261 Il. 222, 103 N.
sel for the defendant in the Alterie E. 1021; People v. Sholem (1920)
case argued that the statute here 294 Il. 204, 128 N. E. 377.
The two principal cases seem to
should be so construed; that it must
be proved that the defendant was be clearly correct for all of the
in fact an habitual violator. If an authorities point to but one solution
analogy can be drawn between this of the problem involved. When the
and the construction in the Morgan statute was enacted its fate must
case the objection to the statute have been foreseen by the legismight be removed but the court, as- lators, but no attempt was made to
suming this to be true, held the term cure its obvious. constitutional de"habitual violator" to be undefined fects. The purpose was worthy but
it may be doubted whether this jusand uncertain.
It has been said that "due process tifies the enactment of the statute
of law requires that one shall not and expensive prosecution under it
be held criminally responsible un- when it was clear that no lasting
der statutes by which offenses are so benefit would be derived from the
indefinitely defined or described as effort. This marks another clash
not to enable one to determine between official zeal for law enwhether or not he is committing forcement by drawing special laws
them": 3 Willoughby "Constitu- for gangsters and judicial anxiety
tional Law" (1929) §1142. The for the integrity of the constitulegislature must so closely define the tion. We have the same general
offense as to leave nothing to be de- problem here presented as in the
termined but the guilt or innocence illegal arrest cases under the conof the person charged: People v. cealed weapon statutes, and the IlliBeak (1920) 291 Ill. 449, 126 N. E. nois court has taken the same stand
201; Connally v. General Constrtc- in the instant cases as in the cases
tion Co. (1926) 269 U. S. 385, 46 last mentioned. (See note to PeoS. Ct. 126; United States v. Cohen ple v. Daies in this issue.) At the
Grocery Co. (1920) 255 U. S. 81, present time, when the public is
41 S. Ct. 298. It was in this regard clamoring for speedy extermination
also that the statute offended for it of gangsters, the court will be critiis "silent as to the degree or extent cized for its backwardness but later,
of reputation or opinion necessary in retrospect, it may possibly be
action under the praised for its determined stand to
to warrant
amendment." Due to the fact that preserve constitutional rights.
S. G. TIPTON.
the statute was so uncertain it in-
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(1930) 341 Ill. 632, 173 N. E. 754,
Note (1932) 22 J. Crim. Law 589;
[Illinois] The defendant was ar- People v. De Luca (1931) 343 Ill.
rested by police officers without a 269, 175 N. E. 370, Note (1932)
warrant,
following curses and 22 J. Crim. Law 593; People v.
threats of injury by shooting made Macklin (1933) 353 Ill. 64, 186 N.
by the defendant from within his E. 531. Other states also follow
home to the officers standing upon this doctrine, but they are recogthe porch. A later search of the nized to be in the minority: Atz v.
premises revealed the pistol with Andrews (1922) 84 Fla. 43, 93 So.
which the defendant had threatened 329; Flum v. State (1923) 193 Ind.
the officers. Following his indict- 585, 141 N. E. 353; Banks v. Comment for altering and obliterating monwealth (1924) 202 Ky. 702, 261
the identification number of his pis- S. W. 262; People v. Thompson
tol as prohibited by statute, Ill. Rev. (1923) 221 Mich. 618, 192 N. W.
Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1933) c. 38. §153a, 560; State v. Owens (1924) 302 Mo.
the defendant moved to suppress the 340, 259 S. W. 100; State v. Joevidence as having been obtained kosh (1923) 181 Wis. 160, 193 N.
by an unlawful entry into the de- W. 976. The English courts and
fendant's home, and an unlawful the majority of the State courts in
search and seizure of the gun in the United States take the opposite
question. The trial court denied the view; i. e., that such illegally obmotion and admitted the pistol in tained evidence, if competent otherquestion as evidence. Held: on ap- wise, is admissible: Phelps v. Prew
peal, affirmed. No error was com- (1854) 3 E. & B. 430; Rex v. Doyle
mitted in refusing to grant the mo- (1886) 12 Ont. 350; Coi-nelson v.
tion, for a sufficient criminal offense State (1922) 18 Ala. App. 639, 94
had been perpetrated in the pres- So. 202; People v. Le Doux (1909)
ence of the officers to warrant the 155 Cal. 535, 102 Pac. 517; Corn
arrest of the defendant and a monwealth v. Donnelly (1923) 246
search of him and his premises: Mass. 507, 141 N. E. 500; People v.
People v. Da~ves (1933) 354 Ill. Defore (1926) 242 N. Y. 13, 150
N. E. 585; State v. Simmons (1922)
168, 188 N. E. 337.
183 N, C. 684, 110 S. E. 591;
This case marks a continuance of
the gradual change of policy of the Adams v. New York (1904) 192
Illinois Supreme Court in regard U. S. 585, 24 S. Ct. 372.
This difference in judicial "points
to the competency of evidence obtained by an act of trespass. Illi- of view" presents an acute problem
nois has consistently adhered to the in the administration of criminal
minority rule, advanced by the justice and this is aggravated by the
United States Supreme Court, to the skillful and scientific methods now
effect that evidence illegally ob- used by the criminal "profession."
tained by unlawful search and seiz- The problem has been nicely stated
ure, even if competent otherwise, is by Justice Cardozo as follows, "The
question is whether protection for
inadmissible: Weeks v. U. S. (1914)
232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341; Silver- the individual would not be gained
at a disproportionate loss of protecthorne Lumber Co. v. U. S. (1919)
251 U. S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182; People tion for society. On the one side
v. Scalisi (1926) 324 Ill. 131, 154 is the social need that crime be reN. E. 715; People v. McGurn pressed. On the other, the social
SEIZURE -
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need that law shall not be flouted
by the insolence of office": People V.
Defore (1926) 242 N. Y. 13 at page
24. The loose constructionists demand that crime be repressed by the!
courts finding probable cause for arrest in the mere fact of weapon concealment, while they are answered
by the claim that over-tolerance toward violations of the law by officers would lead to rashness and
carelessness in their methods of enforcement.
Solution of the dilemma seems to
lie in a clear enunciation of the arrest and search and seizure laws by
the legislatures of the various states.
This relief does not appear to be
presently forthcoming and with the
entire problem having obtained its
present status of acute realism, it
was natural for numerous state
courts to make a change of front
in order to protect the citizens
against encroachment by the criminal classes: Bruce and Rosmarin,
"The Gunman and His Gun" (1933)
24 J. Crim. Law 521, note page 541.
The more liberal rule or majority
doctrine, as set out in the case of
Adams v. New York, supra, is strenuously advocated by both Professors
Wigmore and Greenleaf, who claim
the problem to be one of evidence,
that the evidence of the gun is evidence of the best type, no matter how
obtained, and that the Constitution
is sufficiently adhered to if a suit
for civil damages be allowed for
any wrong committed in obtaining
it: 4 Wigmore, "Evidence" (2nd ed.
1923) §2183 et seq.; 1 Greenleaf,
"Evidence" (16th ed. 1899) §254a.
Judge Bruce, as is made clear in
"The Gunman and His Gun," supra,
would go even further and advocates that it should be held that a
gun speaks for itself and that the
finding of a concealed weapon upon
a person estops the carrier from

questioning the legality of his arrest. Such a holding would, however, be severe and strained under
present statutes and might present
a serious constitutional question.
In the recent cases of People v.
Kissane (1932) 347 Ill. 385, 179 N.
E. 850, and People v. Roberta
(1933) 352 Ill. 189, 185 N. E. 253,
Note (1933) 24 J. Crim. Law 448,
guns were found on the persons of
the defendants and convictions were
affirmed regardless of the lack of a
search warrant and the fact that the
arrests were made on suspicion
In those cases as in the
alone.
one under discussion the proper result was reached by a relaxation of
the rules governing the power of
arrest. In other words, in some but
certainly not all cases, the Illinois
Supreme Court satisfies public
clamor by allowihg almost any suspicion to be the basis for arrest, and
of' course, once arrested the prisoner may be searched. Therefore,
the Court apparently remains on. the
minority side as far as the use of
illegally obtained evidence is concerned, but they are able to achieve
the desired result by allowing "suspicion arrests," a type of seizure not
originally intended by the Illinois
arrest statute: Ill. Rev. Stat. (SmithHurd 1933) c. 38, §657. This, however, seems to be the most satisfactory result which can be reached
under present, conditions for the
court is thus able to curb official
over-enthusiasm and protect the innocent individual while it may also,
in the proper case, aid in curbing
crime by relaxing the requirements
for legal arrest.
CLYDE THEODORE NIssEN.

HOMICIDE-LIABILITY
FOR

DEATH

CAUSED

BY

OF ROBBER
SHOT

THiRD PERsox.-[Arkansas]

OF

Ap-
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pellant and two others, in an attempt to escape from a bank which
they had just robbed, compelled the
deceased, a teller, to accompany
them out of the bank as a shield
from attack from the town marshal.
While attempting to arrest them, the
town marshal intending to shoot the
robbers, accidentally killed the teller.
Appellant was indicted and convicted of first degree murder. Held:
on appeal, affirmed. The conviction
was justified in that the use of the
deceased as a breastwork for the
defendant's protection in completing
his robbery was the cause of the
death: Wilson v. State (Ark. 1934)
68 S. W. (2d) 100.
The appellant relied upon the general principle that if A assaults B
and B, while resisting the assault,
shoots at A and accidently kills C
who is an innocent third party, A
cannot be convicted of the murder
of C: Commonwealth v. Moore.
(1905) 121 Ky. 97, 88 S. W. 1085;
Commonwealth v. Campbell (1863)
89 Mass. 541; Butler v. People
(1887) 125 Ill. 641, 18 N. E. 338.
However, these cases and the principle therein involved are not applicable here. In the Moore case,
supra, the deceased, in no wise connected with either party, was killed
by a shot from one Young who at
the time was assaulted by the defendant with the intent to rob and
kill Young. The court sustained a
demurrer to the indictment. Both
the Canpbell and the Butler cases,
supra, were cases of riot where certain officers, in attempting to quell
the disturbance, accidentally killed
bystanders who were not engaged in
the riot. The prosecution attempted
to hold the rioters responsible for
the killing by the officers who were
opposed to them but the court refused on the ground that the act
was not done by the rioters nor in
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pursuance of any design by them;
that the sheriff was not acting with
them, and they were in no way responsible for his acts. The general
doctrine was laid down in these
cases that no person can be held
responsible for a homicide unless
the act was either actually or constructively committed by him; and
in order to be his act, it must be
committed by his hand, or by someone acting in concert with him or in
furtherance of the common design
or purpose. This is correct doctrine, and applicable to the facts of
those cases, but there is clearly lacking in them a causal connection between the act of the accused and
the homicide.
This element is
brought out by the language in the
Butler case. There the court said:
CC. . . the parties would be responsible for a homicide actually or
constructively committed by them,
and they would be responsible for
what they did themselves, and such
consequences as might naturally
flow from their acts and conduct."
This doctrine would not apply in
the type of case where rioters might
forcibly make use of another in
their design and cause him to be
killed by putting him in a place of
danger.
The case of Taylor v. State
(1900) 41 Tex. Crim. R. 564, 55
S. W. 961, is very similar to the
present case both in the facts and
in the decision. There, the accused
and three others in the attempt to
rob a train, boarded the engine, took
out the engineer and fireman, placed
the latter in front of the express
car and then demanded that the express agent open the door. A passenger appeared and in attempting
to prevent the robbery accidentally
killed the fireman. The court held
that since the death of the fireman
was directly caused by accused and

CRIMINAL CASES
the other robbers in placing him in
a dangerous place, accased was liable, whether the shot was actually
fired by him or the passenger. This
decision was followed in Keaton v.
State (1900) 41 Tex. Crim. R. 621,
57 S. W. 1125. The holding in the
present case might likewise be based
upon the question of causal connection. If the accused directly set
in motion the cause which occasioned the death of deceased, it appears to be a sound doctrine that he
would be as culpable as if he had
done the deed with his own hands.
It is said in Greenleaf, "Evidence"
(16th ed. 1899) §1420: "Forcing a
person to do an act which causes
his death renders the death the
guilty deed of him who compelled
the deceased to do the act, and it is
not material whether the force was
applied to the body or mind." Again
in 1 RusseLl "Crimes" (8th ed.
1923) p. 675 it is said that "forcing a person to do an act which is
likely to produce his death, and
which does produce it, is murder,
and threats may constitute such
force." See also 2 Bishop "New
Criminal Law" (9th ed. 1923) §§424,
636, 637, 657, 679, 689; 1 Wharton
"Criminal Law" (12th ed. 1932)
§§152, 167. The robbers had commanded deceased to take his place
as a breastwork for them and by
threats and force compelled him to
assume such a position so that they
might escape with their loot from
the bank. The causal connection
between the acts of the robbers and
the death of the deceased was complete.
There is a line of cases holding
that if the act intended was criminal (here, for example, forcing the
deceased to take a known place of
danger) the accused must abide the
consequences of his unlawful act,
although the result was not in-

tended: Ringer v. State (1905) 74
Ark. 262. 85 S. W. 410 (the intentional killing of another through
carelessness, without criminal intent
or design) ; Gilmore v. State (1909)
92 Ark. 205, 122 S. W. 493 (blows
struck by the defendant caused
death of deceased by causing him
to fall off of a wagon); Commonwealth v. Mink (1877) 123 Mass.
422 (the killing of one trying to
prevent the accomplishment of a
suicide). It is clear that the act
intended to be performed in the
present case was criminal, and the
consummation of the act should render the appellant liable for the consequences of the unlawful attempt
to rob the bank. Not only does the
court's reasoning seem logical but
the result reached is eminently desirable since the modern bank robber often uses n innocent third
person as an aid to effecting an
escape from the scene of the crime.
SHERMAN ALLEN PERLSTEIN.

MURDER-RECANTATION OF TESTIMONY BY STATE'S PRINCIPAL WITNEss.-[Massachusetts]
The de-

fendant was here charged and convicted of murder almost entirely
upon the evidence of one Dombzalski. This evidence was uncorroborated and was flatly contradicted by
the defendant.
The defendant
moved for a new trial based on
Dombzalski's affidavit stating that
his testimony against the defendant
was false. The trial court denied
the motion. Held: on appeal, affirmed. On a motion for a new trial
it was the judge's duty to gravely
consider whether the testimony of
the recanting witness was true, but

as a matter of law he was not required to grant a new trial: Com-

monwealth. v. Gwizdowski (Mass.
1933) 188 N. E. 383.
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Even though the question of recantation requires a decision as to
the truth of two conflicting statements, it is a matter of law for
judge rather than jury determination: State v. Birzer (1928) 126
Kan. 214, 268 Pac. 842. So far as
is known only in one court has the
principle been enunciated that a
trial court is bound to grant a new
trial in a criminal case when there
is a recantation of material testimony: Martin v. United States (C.
C. A. 5th, 1927) 17 F. (2d) 973.
It is generally held that the granting of a new trial because of the
recantation of a witness is within
the discretion of the trial court:
Wilson v. State (Ga. App. 1915) 84
S. E. 81. This discretion is not
abused if there is other evidence to
support the verdict or if there are
facts and circumstances which show
that the testimony was not false or
at least that the recantation was not
true: State v. Burton (1927) 124
Kan. 509, 260 Pac. 634. Three New
York cases probably contain the best
discussion of the problem: People
v. Shilitano (1916) 218 N. Y. 161,
112 N. E. 733; People v. Giordano
(1919) 175 N. Y. Supp. 715, 106
Misc. Rep. 235; and People v. Cohen
(1921) 191 N. Y. Supp. 831, 117
Misc. Rep. 158. In the Shilitano
case Judge Seabury said: "There
is no form of proof so unreliable as
recanting testimony. In the popular
mind it is often regarded as of
great importance. Those experienced
in the administration of the criminal law know well its untrustworthy
character." According to the majority opinion, once the materiality
of the recanted testimony has been
ascertained, the chief problem for
the trial judge is the weighing of
possible motives for the two contradictory efforts of the witness, and
a new trial should not be awarded
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unless the judge believes that the
recantation is true. The dissent of
judge Hogan was based on his belief that a prosecution for perjury
was the best means of discovering
whether the original testimony or
the recanting testimony was true,
but as is pointed out in the Giordano
case convictions of witnesses for
perjury committed either at the trial
or by recantation are very infrequent. Since it is alvays necessary
to prove which statements were true
and which false, evidence not connected with the trial must be unearthed. Furthermore, the state is
not often anxious to prosecute its
witness for perjury at the trial. Yet
in the Cohen case the witness, as a
matter of fact, had been convicted
of perjury committed at the trial
by the time the case came up to the
reviewing court, but in spite of this
the judge said that a new trial would
not be granted unless he was convinced that the testimony of the
witness was material and that its
recantation would undermine the
state's case. In other words it must
appear that the recantation was true
and that a new trial would result in
an acquittal. See also Shepherd v.
State (Okl. Cr. App. 1931) 300
Pac. 421.
In only a few cases have appellate
courts differed with the trial court,
and the difference ordinarily is over
the truth of the - recanting statements rather than their materiality.
For example, it has been held that
an eleven year old prosecutrix in a
rape case was probably influenced
in her original testimony by her
neighbors who were enemies of the
accused: Myers v. State (1914) 111
Ark. 399, 163 S. W. 1177; that the
testimony at trial of a woman in a
homicide case involving a love triangle should be considered false
when later recanted: Roath v. State
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(1932) 185 Ark. 1039, 50 S. W. (2d)
985; and that a daughter angry at
her father because of a family quarrel probably falsely testified against
him only to later repent: Douglas
v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1932) 54
S. W. (2d) 515. Likewise an appellate court refused to affirm a denial of a motion for a new trial
when the state's sole witness was of
doubtful character and had recanted
while in jail awaiting grand jury
action on two felony charges:
Green v. State (1923) 94 Tex. Cr.
App. 637, 252 S. W. 499. A most
unusual case was one in which the
three witnesses for the state, who
alone identified the accused, later
wrote letters to the state's attorney
saying that they believed their
identification was erroneous and that
they would not testify against the
accused on a rehearing. A motion
for a new trial having been denied,
the question before the court on appeal was whether this was a collusive recantation or one made in
good faith. It was held to have
been made in good faith, and a new
trial was granted: People v. Heinen
(1921) 300 Ill. 498, 133 N. E. 232.
See also Powell v. Commonwealth
(1922) 133 Va. 741, 112 S. E. 657.
On the other hand, reviewing courts
have affirmed denials of the motion
for a new trial when statute or
precedent seemed to require a perjury conviction as a condition precedent: State v. Burrick (1906) 129
Ga. 589, 59 S. E. 288; Morrow v.
State (1926) 36 Ga. App. 217, 136
S. E. 92; where the recantation
seemed to be merely the result of
a change of heart on the part of
the witness: State v. Hughes (1926)
78 Mont. 87, 252 Pac. 320; or where
the recanting witness appeared to
be a moron: State v. Dodge (1925)
124 Me. 243, 127 AtI. 899.
With the above principles and de-
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cisions in mind the instant case presents a rather close question. There
is no doubt that the testimony of
Dombzalski was necessary to support the verdict, but the question as
to which of his statements was true
is not so easy of solution. On the
night of the murder the defendant
asked the witness to go in his Ford
with him to get some beer. It was
the testimony of the witness as to
what happened on this ride which
was largely responsible for the conviction. Nevertheless, the opinion
of the court does not indicate that
there was either a peculiar relation
between the witness and the deceased or between the witness and
the defendant which would create a
motive for false testimony. Apparently the former were not acquainted while the latter seemingly
were on good terms, regardless of
whether they were fast friends or
merely acquaintances. On the contrary, these circumstances show a
motive for a false recantation., It
has been said that the fact that the
recantation may be perjured weakens the former testimony: Green v.
State (1923) 94 Tex. Cr. App. 637,
252 S. W. 499. However, it is believed that the opinion is sound and
shows a tendency which should encourage fair-minded and sincere
prosecutors.
GEORGE F. DYcHE.
HOmICIDE-PRESENCE AT A SUICIDE AS AIDING AND ABETTINGDUTY TO INTERFERE.-[English] In
a prosecution for murder, the defendant was charged with sitting by
and watching his wife drown their
two children and then drown herself. The trial court instructed the
jury that if the defendant, having
power to interfere, had passively
watched his wife drown her chil-
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dren and then herself he was guilty
of manslaughter even though he had
not persuaded or encouraged her.
The jury found the defendant guilty
of manslaughter of both children
and wife. Held: on appeal, affirmed
and modified. The relationship of
husband and wife and that of parent and child placed the defendant
under a positive duty to interfere
and his failure to do so was tantamount to encouragement. He was
therefore an accessory before the
fact and guilty of murder in the
second degree: Rex v. Russel (1933)
Vict. L. R. 59.
If an individual has performed no
overt act or has done nothing to assist, encourage or show approval of
the execution of the homicide and it
only appears that he was present
and tacitly approved of it he cannot be held guilty of murder: Clem
v. State (1870) 33 Ind. 418. It is
the general rule that to constitute
murder in the second degree the
accused must have participated in
the act committed and mere presence at the scene of the crime does
not impose an obligation to prevent
it: Plummer v. Commonwealth
(1866) 64 Ky. 76; Wharton, "Criminal Law" (12th ed. 1932) §246;
United States v. Neverson (D. C.
1880) 1 Mackey 152; State v. Hildreth (1849) 31 N. C. 440. Presence alone is merely some evidence
of the existence of assent and approval: People v. Cione (1920) 293
Ill. 321, 127 N. E. 626.
If this general rule had been applicable in the instant case no conviction could have been obtained for
the defendant had done nothing to
encourage the suicide. He had been
on the spot and had failed to prevent it. However, there are said
to be several limitations to this rule.
Eminent authorities have stated that
consenting to the perpetration of a

crime is sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting: 1 Chitty "Criminal Law," p. 256; Hale's P. C., pp.
374, 618. But the sense in which
these authorities have used the word
"consent," as drawn from the decisions cited therein, implies more
than its proper and popular import
and they are not authority for the
proposition that mere consent without encouragement is sufficient:
Clem v. State, supra; Clark and
Marshall "Crimes" (2d ed. 1905)

§179.
Another alleged limitation to the
general rule as stated in Wharton,
op. cit. supra is where an amicable
relationship exists. In such a case
mere presence may be sufficient to
constitute encouragement, but the
basis for this limitation is that the
presence of a friend lends confidence to the perpetrator by the
former's potential readiness to assist if necessary and to aid in a
possible retreat or escape. Thus the
rule applies to the encouragement of
the perpetrator of a crime against
a third person and is not applicable
here for the deceased was engaged
in the commission of an act for
which only she could suffer and for
which she need not fear punishment.
A further limitation to the general rule appears when there is a
positive duty to interfere or prevent the crime: Bishop, "Criminal
Law" (9th ed. 1923) §633. According to Wharton, op. cit. supra, the
duty here contemplated is a contract obligation the nonfeasance of
which in itself constitutes the commission of a crime, such as where
a watchman, whose duty it is to tend
a railroad switch, fails to turn the
switch for the malicious purpose of
wrecking the train. In such a case
the original plan, for its execution,
called for no affirmative act. It is
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upon this exception that the conviction in the present case rests but
here the duty is of a different character. The crime itself is independent of the obligation. The obligation which is said to require the
interference of the defendant is
predicated on the duty of a man to
provide food, clothing, shelter, and
protection to his wife and children.
Thus, a parent who negligently
withholds food and other necessaries
for his child, having the means to
supply such necessaries, in consequence of which the child dies, is
guilty of manslaughter, and if such
withholding is wilful, the act is
murder: Regina v. Conde (1867) 10
Cox C. C. 547; Pallis v. State (1898)
123 Ala. 12, 26 So. 339. Likewise,
if a husband wilfully abandons his
wife to the destruction of the elements when he can save her the
crime is murder, although he committed no affirmative act: Territory
v. Manton (1887) 7 Mont. 162, 14
Pac. 639. But this duty only extends to a case where the wife is
helpless and unable to take care of
herself: Territory v. Manton (1888)
8 Mont. 95, 19 Pac. 387; State v.
Smith (1876) 65 Me. 257. Since
the wife in this case was not helpless, the defendant was not, because
of his duty to support and protect
her, liable for failing to prevent her
drowning herself.
As to the children, in virtually all
the cases consulted where criminal
liability was imposed for failure of
support, the direct gist of the crime
which caused the death of the infant has been the non-feasance of
the father or mother, analogous to
the case of the switchman above,

rather than a non-feasance in preventing the affirmative act of another. See Regina v. Conde, supra,
where the father was held for manslaughter in negligently failing to
provide food for his child, who consequently died of starvation; and
see Stehr v. State (1913) 92 Neb.
755, 139 N. W. 676, where the crime
was a failure to provide medical assistance for a child with frozen feet
who subsequently developed gangrene and died.
The distinction between a nonfeasance as the cause of the death,
and one which merely fails to prevent a death caused by the affirmative act of another is somewhat
tenuous, but should, nevertheless, be
drawn to prevent such an extreme
extension of criminal liability as was
imposed in this' case. It is submitted that to hold a man as a murderer for failing to prevent a suicide
is contrary to the general principles
of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
It is true that the trial court in this
case found the defendint guilty of
manslaughter only. But in view of
the fact that his guilt was considered by the appellate court as
that of an accessory before the fact,
a verdict of murder, as the majority
of the court decided, would have
been more logical. One cannot be
an accessory before the fact to manslaughter since it is an unpremedi
tated crime: Regina v. Taylor
1(1875) L. R. 2 C. C. 147, 13 Cox

C. C. 68.

The defendant's crime

was silence; a conviction for murder under such circumstances is too
drastic.
ALFXANDER S.

MALTMAN.

